The Contemporary Period, c. 1914 to the Present: Handout 6.5: A Global Cold War

Fear of a growing disparity between U.S. and Soviet military power, and fear of atomic war in any case, may influence the present allies of the United States to refrain from joining the U.S. in taking a more positive political position against the USSR.

The USSR, accordingly, will be in a position to exploit non-communist hesitation and reluctance to resort to strong counter-measures.

These conditions would facilitate the extension of Soviet political control over so much of Eurasia as virtually to isolate the United States without having to participate in direct military action.

The Soviet Union had detonated their first atomic weapon in August of 1949, roughly one year before this report was completed.

Source A: Excerpt from a memorandum of a conversation between Soviet Ambassador to Egypt D. S. Solod and Egyptian Prime Minister G. Nasser, June 15, 1954

[Nasser] gave the impression that the U.S. was offering military help but that the stipulations were of a kind that Egypt could not accept.

Nasser explained that Egypt did not approach the Soviet government directly because it was apprehensive that it might receive a negative response.

They carry on a keenly contested arms race, station massive forces abroad and set up military bases everywhere, threatening the independence and security of all nations.

They both keep subjecting other countries to their control, subversion, interference or aggression.

They both exploit other countries economically, plundering their wealth and grabbing their resources.

He also gave them back their own horrific history, which his predecessors had hidden and distorted for sixty years.

It tended to see a monolithic, totalitarian power, hell-bent on world domination; for many years, it also saw a Soviet Union that seemed to be advancing that goal relentlessly.

It tended to see a monolithic, totalitarian power, hell-bent on world domination; for many years, it also saw a Soviet Union that seemed to be advancing that goal relentlessly.

It tended to see a monolithic, totalitarian power, hell-bent on world domination; for many years, it also saw a Soviet Union that seemed to be advancing that goal relentlessly.

His prescriptions for radical change were acceptable to many of his countrymen because they understood their country had fallen into a disastrous state.

His prescriptions for radical change were acceptable to many of his countrymen because they understood their country had fallen into a disastrous state.

When historians explain the end of the Cold War, the triumph of the West, the demise of communism, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, they often start with the Soviets’ 1979 decision to invade Afghanistan.

When historians explain the end of the Cold War, the triumph of the West, the demise of communism, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, they often start with the Soviets’ 1979 decision to invade Afghanistan.

Of course, the problems that undid the USSR—economic dysfunction, political illegitimacy, instructional atrophy—ran deeper than a foreign intervention that backfired.

Of course, the problems that undid the USSR—economic dysfunction, political illegitimacy, instructional atrophy—ran deeper than a foreign intervention that backfired.

It also set the stage for Mikhail Gorbachev’s futile attempt to reform Soviet politics and economics, the liberation of Eastern Europe, the abandonment of communism, and the dissolution of the USSR.

Rather, it ended in Taliban rule, the rise of al Qaeda, Islamist extremism within Russia proper, and lasting harm to Russian standing in South Asia.